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James John Tritten
Attempts to theorize about the nature of warfare or to
describe basic principles of military science or strategy often
pay only limited attention to naval warfare. Despite the fact
that significant numbers of strategic nuclear weapons are found
at sea, most discussions of deterrence theory and arms control
have been devoid of special considerations due to their location
at sea; i.e., attrition during the conventional phase of a war.
When military operations specialists create simulations and games
for naval warfare, they often relegate combat at sea to a special
adjunct category outside the mainstream of models.
This stems in part to years of preparing only for the "short"
war; one which might be over in a matter of days or a few weeks,
or before navies could affect the outcome through their role in
resupply and reinforcement. For years, the political and military
leaders of many nations took the "revolution in military affairs"
to mean that nuclear weaponry made obsolete any war whose outcome
depended upon the sealines of communication or naval actions at
sea. A standard joke amongst some Sovietologists and land-
oriented military strategists has the marshals, when they reach
the Atlantic in a future war, asking each other, "by the way, who
won the war at sea?"
Maritime specialists could also be accused of concentrating
on operations at sea to the detriment of appreciating how armed
conflict at sea affects the overall war and its components
ashore. "Where is, repeat, where is Task Force 3 4? The world
wonders" asked the padding at the end of Admiral Nimitz ' message
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to Admiral Halsey during the Battle for Leyte Gulf. This battle
typifies the potential disconnect between naval commanders biased
towards decisive battles and an overall commander-in-chief
seeking wider strategic objectives.
Despite the debates over the U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy,
there sometimes lingers a perception amongst some politicians and
academics (occasionally reinforced by naval personnel) that
maritime spokesmen often act as though navies can win the war
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alone. Despite the lack of anything called Soviet naval
strategy in the lexicon of Soviet military science, we in the
West often write articles, books, and intelligence reports about
their single service strategic perspective for a nation where
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such a cultural bias cannot exist. In short, the Soviets have
concluded that naval warfare is not unique and do not use the
term naval strategy.
The term "unique" is used deliberately, to test the most
4
demanding claims made in the past. Although "unique" was
selected, the reader may choose to substitute "different"
throughout if he rejects the concept that any form of warfare is
"unique." This paper also discusses each form of warfare without
consideration of cross medium warfare. Although one can argue
that land warfare is now in reality air-land warfare, this paper
will primarily contrast sea warfare with combat ashore.
Debates over the uniqueness of naval warfare are not limited
to those in the American literature. One can posit that the
whole series of articles, monographs, and books signed out by the
late Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov were
designed to educate land-oriented marshals about the importance
of naval warfare. Even recent articles in the Soviet literature
attempt to reconcile the need to pay homage to a single combined
arms military strategy with the peculiarities of operating at
5
sea.
If naval warfare is unique, the mainstream of military
thought and modeling should be developed apart from naval theory
and strategy. If this is true, then navies should logically
operate in mutual support of land forces, rather than as a part
of a fully integrated force. Naval arms control would come under
a special autonomous category rather than being an element of a
comprehensive regime. The burden of explaining the rationale and
requirements for the fleet, its operation and command, would fall
clearly on the shoulders of naval officers and theorists, with a
parallel burden placed upon land-oriented theorists and
commanders to appreciate the uniqueness of naval operations.
On the other hand, if naval warfare is not truly unique, then
both sides in this debate need to better understand how naval
operations are to be integrated into a combined arms or joint
doctrine for warfare. The naval component would have to be
routinely factored in and not considered just an afterthought.
Naval proponents would have to become comfortable with the
theoretical and doctrinal terms common to all services and
articulate their contribution to the overall war effort in those
terms. Naval arms control would not be separated into a discrete
category but included in comprehensive proposals and agreements.
Having come to grips with whether or not there are essential
differences between naval and land warfare, we must
simultaneously factor in unique cultural, geo-political and
politico-military aspects among nations if we are to ever
properly analyze campaigns or to conduct net assessments. We
cannot even begin to model Soviet and U.S. /NATO maritime opera-
tions without recognizing the differences in socio-political and
military-strategic culture matter that must be captured by the
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operations analyst. Do we first address political-cultural
differences and then deal with specific attributes of the
different types of warfare, or attempt to handle military
questions first, then apply the cultural differences?
Whereas everyone has had experience operating ashore and
within his national culture, very few can bridge the gulf between
cultures, and even fewer understand their own maritime opera-
tions, let alone those of other nations. It devolves then on the
specialist who understands both to attempt to explain why these
differences matter. This paper will primarily contrast Soviet
(Red) behavior with U.S. /NATO (Blue).
The most logical procedure seems to be a multi-tier
consideration of maritime operations and naval warfare. First,
the environmental and geographic realities of life at sea should
be considered along with international legal peculiarities.
Second, the broad strategic principles of naval warfare should be
contrasted with those oriented toward land warfare. Third, the
operational and tactical levels of warfare should be analyzed to
assess the differences between campaigns ashore and at sea.
Finally, essential differences should be contrasted with an
ultimate judgment whether models need to be different for war
ashore and at sea, or for Red and Blue. Having considered these
elements, we should be better equipped to conclude whether naval
warfare is unique.
II
Among the most obvious reasons that nations need navies and
other maritime assets is that 70% of the earth is covered by
oceans and seas. One cannot use the seas without the hardware
necessary to sail on, under, or over the oceans. When
constructing that hardware, it is quickly evident that the oceans
present environmental and geographic considerations, phenomena,
and climate that challenge to life, let alone the full
exploitation of military potential.
The hunter and the hunted at sea often do not operate in the
o
same environment. The threat at sea must be considered from 360
of the compass and from above, on, or under the ocean as well as
from space and the shore. Whereas ashore, battle lines and
obvious lines of communications can usually be identified, the
nature of war at sea defines areas of relative and temporary
control. An ever-present guerrilla war at sea makes rear areas
only somewhat safer than those ashore.
The size and opaqueness of the oceans led Western nations to
hide the bulk of their strategic nuclear warheads at sea. Even
if the carrier of strategic nuclear warheads is found, its
identification, localization, and destruction are extremely
difficult tasks. Lacking artificial and geographic constraints,
naval warfare is often fought over extremely large spaces with
large numbers of units that move with relative ease. The sea is
considered a generally interconnected whole, so that war at sea
between global powers, is automatically global war. To argue
that we can arbitrarily separate maritime theaters of combat is
to speculate that when there is a war in Europe, enemy naval
forces meeting in mid-Pacific wilL render passing honors.
Land warfare, with the exception of guerrilla warfare, is
generally fought over territory, hence gaining land behind one' s
leading edge of troops, is a proper measure of effectiveness.
Alternatively, land warfare can be considered fought for the
right to administer laws and regulations over populations, hence
numbers of controlled people or the neutralization/destruction of
opponents are also proper measures of effectiveness. Political
boundaries ashore are often, but not always, determined from the
final battle lines.
Naval warfare is fought over communications; the ability to
use the sea for one's own advantage and to deny that use to an
enemy. The proper measures of effectiveness are the unhindered
use of the seas and the attrition or neutralization of enemy
forces capable of preventing that use. Destruction or
neutralization of vital enemy assets is the major contribution of
navies to the war effort rather than maintaining a presence at
the forward edge of a battle area. There are exceptions, of
course, where a naval presence can tie down land troops that
would otherwise re-deploy.
Ocean areas cannot be permanently won or lost. An area of
relative control can be vacated and need not be garrisoned unless
navies are projecting power ashore. Political boundaries at sea
are effected more by the political boundaries ashore than they
are by the final naval battle lines.
In addition to these above inherent differences, there are
also man-made differences in the legal regimes. In war at sea,
the private property of an enemy and, in certain circumstances,
the private property of neutrals, is subject to confiscation by
commanders of belligerent warships and aircraft. Generally, in
land warfare private property is not supposed to be disturbed by
contending military forces. Certain types of vessels and aircraft
at sea may never be made the object of an attack. Examples
include hospital ships and evacuation aircraft, vessels on
religious, scientific, or philanthropic missions, small fishing
vessels, and boats engaged in coastal trade.
The open ocean belongs to no one. Products from the sea,
formerly belonged to no one until harvest. Today, there are
special ownership rights accorded resources found on continental
shelves and within exclusive economic zones. Ownership of
products on the seabed of the high seas has yet to be resolved.
Transit across, over, or under the high seas cannot be denied.
This provides navies a special advantage, being able to travel
without legal restriction over, on, or under most of the earth's
surface.
With internationally accepted norms of transit or innocent
passage through archipelagos, straits, and the territorial seas
of other nations, maritime forces can generally reach the shores
of another coastal nation without hindrance. This is recognized
and appreciated by both major powers, who often engage in naval
diplomacy, and the smaller coastal states which would like the
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option of having a friendly show of force off their shores. The
threat to naval forces increases with their closeness to those
shorelines. With ever increasing importance accorded by a coastal
state to waters near its own shores, maritime forces make major
political statements by their presence in certain portions of the
seas, by their continued presence, or timely withdrawal. A
maritime presence by warships in another nation's exclusive
economic zone, or waters claimed as historic, or even on innocent
passage in territorial waters, presents other nations the oppor-
tunity for political action or escalation both laterally and over
time without having to act vertically.
International conventions prohibit the use of certain types
of mines and torpedoes, which have no real parallel in land or
air warfare, although each form of warfare has its own special
legal restrictions. At sea, torpedoes must, become harmless should
they miss their target. Anchored mines must similarly become
harmless if they break free. Unanchored mines must become
harmless within one hour of loss of control. In all cases of mine
warfare at sea, international agreements require that precautions
must be taken to grant security to peaceful shipping.
Although the above environmental, geographic, and legal
factors have been cast in terms of "unique" properties associated
with the sea. there are many parallels in non-maritime operations
and warfare. For example, although it is more difficult to
support life at sea than ashore, life support in the air or in
space can be orders of magnitude greater. We have not yet begun
to appreciate the military potential of space due to these
complexities.
A spherical threat at sea is seldom taken for granted by the
individual surface or subsurface naval warrior, whereas in air
and space warfare, it is obvious. The similarities between naval
surface warfare and desert warfare have yet to be fully
recognized. Although most naval warfare lacks a "forward edge"
to the battle area, amphibious warfare does not. Blockade is a
form of naval warfare, and forward maritime strategies designed
to keep enemy navies bottled up in defensive bastions recognize
the possibility of battle lines at sea.
The advantage of hiding strategic nuclear warheads at sea may
diminish with the advent of mobile intercontinental range
missiles. Indeed, the similarities with surveillance and
targeting may make classic antisubmarine warfare theory
applicable to campaigns fought against mobile missiles. One
obvious difference will remain, however. Whereas a nation may
find it politically easy to attack an enemy's nuclear assets
hidden at sea during the conventional phase of a war, he may find
it much more difficult to attack those same assets hidden on
enemy territory.
Although naval forces may operate over large areas of the
earth, air power has similar capabilities and is also capable of
delivering tremendous firepower in even less time than can naval
forces. The threat to virtually any force increases with its
closeness to an opponent's home areas; this factor is not unique
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to naval warfare and has been essentially negated by the advent
of the intercontinental range missile.
War in space is even more automatically a global war due to
the total absence of any geographic restrictions. Air and space
forces also do not fight for territory but rather to use airspace
and deny it to an enemy. Although the air immediately above
national territory belongs to that nation, the space above that
7
belongs to no one and passage through it cannot be denied.
Strategic nuclear war theory is very similar to naval warfare in
that destruction of major assets is the proper measure of
campaign effect! v/eness
.
Environmental and geograpnic factors are most otcen used tc
testify to the unigue nature of maritime operations and warfare,
yet we see numerous parallels with desert and space warfare. The
similarities between space warfare and war at sea are striking
and increasing if one considers legal issues.
ii
Ill
Strategies for employing navies can be predicted by geo-
graphic realities such as island status, continental or maritime
consciousness, types of terrain, etc. Similar geographic
considerations also allow prediction of land warfare strategies.
Geographic realities, for example, predict that navies alone
could not defeat Nazi Germany or cannot defeat the Soviet Union
today but that the failure to win at sea could cause NATO to lose
a war.
Past naval strategies have vacillated between the indirect
and the direct approach. Blockade, threats by fleets in being, as
well as decisive battle against a main battle fleet are totally
acceptable actions for naval operations in wartime. Land warfare
strategies have perhaps paid more attention to decisive battles
but successful strategists have utilized the full spectrum of
options, including the indirect approach, to attain victory.
A frequently cited advantage of naval forces is the full
spectrum of warfare they bring to the battle area. The modern
carrier battle group is ready to engage in warfighting at
virtually any point in the ocean or the adjacent coastline and
against any enemy. Yet, despite the impressive force that a
carrier battle group can bring to a coastal area, it is ill-
suited to deal completely with common insurgencies and terrorism.
There are still forms of warfare that require a man on the ground
with a gun in his hands.
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International maritime law and the laws of war make special
and unique provisions for military operations on the high seas in
time of peace, and armed conflict with unarmed and armed non-
combatants and non-belligerents within the battle area. At sea,
it is easier to identify non-combatants and to minimize
collateral damage to them. These factors are not unique to naval
warfare theory; only significantly less expensive to attain. The
rights of non-belligerents in space arc probably similar to those
at sea.
Nations will fight tneir next mijor wars at sea with the nav^
that survives the first salvo. Major fleet units must be already
built, trained, and outfitted without need for last minute
supplies or personnel. Replacemer t ships may never be constructed
before a future war ends Lesser demanding campaigns, of course,
will continue to be able tc rely on taking up civilian shipping
and boats. A proper method of calculating the ever changing
correlation of forces in a major war is to alse calculate the
opportunity cost of the loss of assets irreplaceable during the
remainder of the war.
A modern armored division cannot be created overnight either.
It is also unlikely that strategic nuclear delivery vehicles 01
significant numbers of airplane^ will be built during a future
war to supplant attrition. U.S. strategic nuclear forcr
programming strategies and declaratory employment policies arc
based upon forces surviving a well-executed Soviet first strike.
A modern major war between the superpowers will also be conducted
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with the armed forces that survive the first salvo and existing,
already trained, and equipped reserves.
Whereas concepts for the operational level of warfare appear
to be identical whether combat occurs on land or at sea, one can
argue that some of those concepts seem to matter more, or assume
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special characteristics, if one is at sea. For example, it
appears that massing (concentration of fire) is a prerequisite
for a successful combat strike at sea against certain classes of
well protected targets. If true, this could mean that a Soviet
naval commander ' s calculations might demonstrate the need for
attack with nuclear weapons, considering the survival potential
of an enemy ship to conventional attack. Unlike in land warfare,
however, massing occurs at sea when assets widely dispersed for
defense are temporarily concentrated to execute a strike or
conduct a battle.
With so much of the earth covered with water, maritime
warfare is pursued primarily where the surface provides few
opportunities for concealment. Hence, deception is more difficult
to achieve. Surprise and deception are vital components of Soviet
military art but appear to be even more important at sea: if
surprise is successful at sea, then perhaps operational or even
strategic objectives can be met in the early stages of a war.
In undersea warfare, the naval tactician and operational
planner must consider the terrain of his battlefield like his
land-oriented counterpart. Contemporary trends in undersea
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warfare may invite the naval tactician to study land warfare in
much greater detail than in the past.
Clausewitz argued, successfully, that the defense is the
stronger form of warfare ashore. We are comfortable with
heuristics in land warfare like a favorable 3:1 offense/defense
combat capability force ratio to overcome prepared defenses.
Naval operations seem to reguire only 4:3 for conclusive
9
engagements and a 3:2 advantage to crush an enemy with the
American victory at Midway being a case of winning with an
inferior force. Success in close-m defense may require a 1:3
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offense/defense force ratio. In certain normaj defensive naval
operations, such as protection in sea lines of communication, the
operation should be subjected to rigorous testing which would
help illuminate the differences in land and sea warfare. It
appears that the offense is the stronger form of warfare at sea.
Attacks by a weaker force and attacks as an integral element
of defense, have a long tradition in the sea services. The
attacker in land warfare attempts to pit his strength against,
enemy weakness. At sea, the attacker must eventually attack the
enemy's strongest targets to succeed in battle, although
obviously in a manner that minimizes the threat.
History records that in land warfare, strategic reserves are
a vital necessity; with the epa tome of generalship being, in
part, demonstrated by committing the reserves at the vita i place
and at the crucial time. Reserves are rarely used this way in
naval warfare, it being more important to mass for a decisive
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battle. Thus, attrition in key battles rather than combat over
extended periods, is an essential element of naval warfare.
Campaigns fought over the sealines of communications are a
significant exception.
Modern naval, air, and space warfare will all likely be short
bursts of concentrated combat instead of prolonged and continuous
engagements, conducted in a target-poor environment. In a
strategic defense environment, if defenses are to be overcome,
massing may become as important to strategic nuclear warfare as
it now is to naval warfare.
Yet maneuver is also an essential ingredient of naval
warfare. The extended mobility of fleets enables them to change
instantaneously from the defensive to the offensive without
warning. This is also true of air and space warfare and can be
true of land warfare. Maneuver warfare to a seaman, however, is
generally considered in relative, not geographic terms.
The size of the battle area in land warfare is normally
smaller than in naval warfare and is freguently fixed by
geographic constraints or political boundaries. Although this
could occur in battles proximate to land, it is also possible to
fight in the open sea in a battle space that depends entirely
upon the area selected by the commander to dispose his forces.
Thus, a general principle of Soviet military art—simultaneous
pressure on the enemy to the full depth of his operationally
deployed area—takes on a different meaning at sea since the
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spatial scope of the battle area is less likely to be
predictable.
Navies, as presently constructed, cannot fight and win
nuclear wars at sea, a frequently cited criticism of modern
navies. Armies likewise cannot fight and win against nuclear
enemy to not use his nuclear forces against both armies and
navies. Extended nuclear deterrence, therefore, extends not over
allied nations, but also over our fleets at sea.
Although nuclear warfare at sea is easily contemplated by
land-oriented theorists (lack of collateral damage and the holes
fill in), it is no more the preferred option for U.S naval
commanders than nuclear war is preferred bv ground forces
commanders. U.S. declaratory strategy has been to not allow a
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nuclear war to be limited to the maritime region. The
advantages of higher probabilities of kill in nuclear war at sea
are offset by environmental damage, loss of control, and predict-
ability in battle management due to the increased "fog of war."
Certainly, nuclear war in space wiJl reflect many of the same
advantages and disadvantages as nuclear war at sea. If one were
to argue that a nuclear war could be confined to one sphe -e , It
would more likely be space and not the sea.
Although not necessarily unique, it is probably more .likely
that naval forces of the superpowers will have onboard both
nuclear and conventional weapons during the conventional phase of
a war. Hence when contemplating actions during the conventional
phase, each side must account for the ever changing nuclear
17
correlation of forces, as unused weapons are lost to combat
12
actions against weapons carrier.
Maritime forces are often at a serious disadvantage at sea by
their inability to determine hostile intent in time to provide an
effective defense. Modern warships in the Persian Gulf have the
sensors to help determine the identify of an unknown target but
even when the identify is known, still might not be able to
determine whether that target is going to attack in sufficient
time to mount a defense. One might argue that this situation
holds in all other forms of warfare, but the conseguences of the
loss of an aircraft carrier today or a battleship in the past are
significantly different than the loss of an army brigade or a
few aircraft.
Furthermore, not all maritime forces are capable of either
identifying an unknown target or even knowing that hostile enemy
targets are in the vicinity. Examples of this would be Marines
transiting on amphibious ships, Army troops or eguipment given
passage on ships taken from the merchant marine, or Air Force
eguipment on a pre-positioned depot ship. None of these ships
would likely have any onboard antisubmarine warfare eguipment
and, if operating alone, might have the first indication of
hostile intent when a torpedo struck home.
Major warships also have difficulties determining hostile
intent. Ships attempting to hide by operating under emissions
control will not be able to use their full suite of active
sensors. Some nations do not yet have sea-based airborne early
18
warning aircraft to assist in battle group defense. The sounds
of diesel-electric submarine on batteries may be so slight or
general to preclude either identification or classification.
Problems in resolving hostile intent are not unique to naval
warfare but the consequences of the inability to do so put this
factor into a genuine special category. The more we reduce the
number of aim points, as we have done in the numbers of aircraft
carriers and strategic nuclear submarines, the more we must study
this issue and generate creative rules of engagement . The loss of
even one OHIO class submarine, lets an enemy achieve a signi-
ficant strategic objective of reducing our ability to threaten or
13
strike his homeland by aimost two hundred nuclear warheads.
There are numerous other claims to the uniqueness of naval
14
warfare and maritime operations, but on inspection most cf
these actually have parallels in other forms of warfare. Such
claims include the close interaction between forces in peacetime,
the difficulty in surveillance and targeting, unique maritime
organizations such as antisubmarine and hydrogr. aphic/navj nation
units, short tactical logistics tails, contested logistics lines,
inability to replenish during combat, and the inability to model
the complex interactions of air, surface, and subsurface warfare
which characterize carrier battle group operations. Each of
these has parallels in other forms of warfare but, in all cases,
there are specific factors that require consideration because the
operation takes lace on above, or under the sea.
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IV
The evidence thus far is mixed at best. Despite objective
evidence and the ability to apparently argue the case for or
against the "uniqueness" or "difference" of naval warfare, most
defense and military specialists, in and out of uniform, deem
that maritime affairs, naval operations, naval warfare, or people
in the naval service are outside the mainstream of military
consciousness. Consider the following remarks in the private war
journals of Colonel General Franz Haider in June 1942, when all
was not going well on the Eastern front:
"The Naval Operations Staff's picture of the war situation
strays far from our sober view of facts. Those people are
dreaming in terms of continents . Having watched the Army's
performance to date, they assume without another thought that it
all just depends on what we like to do and when. . . They are glibly
talking about land operations through Italian Africa to the East
Africa Coast and South Africa. The problems of the Atlantic are
treated with off-hand superiority and those of the Black Sea with
criminal unconcern. 15
More recently, there has been an interesting analysis of why
more Navy and Marine Corps officers entertain doubts about the
value of nuclear weapons than their colleagues in other
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services. It is not clear that the sample for this study that
drew this conclusion was scientific; however, it is not the first
time this comment has surfaced.
The RAND Corporation Arroyo Center recently published a
monograph for the U.S. Army that explores the alleged cultural
17
biases of the individual military services. The U.S. Army is
described as having "its roots in the citizenry. . .service to the
nation, and... utter devotion to the nation. . .taken greater pride
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in the basic skills of soldiering than in their equipment ... the
most secure of the three services. . .aimed at getting a single
answer (often a number) rather than illuminating the alternatives
in the face of recognized uncertainties. . .not shown any
particular strong affinity for strategy. . .unique among the
services in its acceptance of national strategies in peacetime
which it is both utterly committed tc execute and unlikely to be
able tc successfully prosecute in wartime." "What is the Army/ It
is first and foremost, the nation's obedient and loyal milita'i
servant . "
The U.S. Air Force is "said to worship at the altar of
technology.
.
.by far the most attached of the services tc
toys ... always the most sensitive to defending or guarding it r-
legitimacy as an independent institution. . .supremely confident
about its relevance. .. the most comfortable of the three services
with analysis .. .the most comfortable with strategy and things
strategic. . .but not irrevocably committed to their execution in
war." "Who is the Air Force? it is the keeper and wi elder of the
decisive instruments of war.''
The Navy is characterized as being "far less toy
oriented. . .more likely to associate themselves with the Navy as
an institution. .. the hypochondriac of the services, constantly
taking its own temperature or pulse, finding it inadequate,
caught up in an anxiety largely of its own making. .. supremely
confident of its legitimacy as an independent institution, but
with the advent of long-range aviation, and again with nuclear
weapons, its relevancy has come into question. . .has little
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tolerance of analysis for planning or evaluating the Navy. . .may
advocate strategies in peacetime to their advantage, but they are
not irrevocably committed to their execution in war." "Who is the
Navy? It is the supra-national institution that has inherited the
British Navy' s throne to naval supremacy."
Are these comments germane to an objective analysis of the
differences, or degree of unigueness of naval and other types of
warfare, or are they merely anecdotes of interest to would-be
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reformers and interesting copy for public consumption? To me,
despite objective evidence to the contrary, there is an over-
whelming perception that naval warfare is very "different."
These differences in perception must be reflected by the model
builder. Where the actual processes of combat do not contain
different dynamics that are in-fact different, then the model of
combat need not be different.
There is more substance to these perceptual differences than
might initially meet the eye. For example, the Navy takes it for
granted that naval warfare is so unigue due to geographic
realities that there are differences in "doctrine" between the
Atlantic and Pacific fleets. Until recently, there were
differences in "doctrine" between the air, surface, and sub-
surface forces. The Air Force accepts that there are differences
in "doctrine" between branches of their service (but that only
one of these branches has a major role in deciding the issues).
The Army takes it for granted that there can only be one doctrine
for the conduct of all warfare.
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In nuclear wargames, there are significant differences in how
Red and Blue navies ought to be played. For example , in a model
we can probably represent the correct level of nuclear warheads
on patrol by having the Red Navy deploy its strategic nuclear
submarines in the deep ocean rather than in bastions. Similarly
in a model we could probably have the Red Navy achieve the
correct damage expected on attacks against carrier battle groups
by accounting for attacks by air-breathing units only instead of
in coordination with submarines.
Both these portrayals of Red would be absolutely incorrect,
since the models would no longer attempt to capture reality and
force players to deal with the problem expected. At all levels of
warfare, it is extremely important to accurately represent combat
if a purpose of the game or simulation is to test strategies,
operations, or tactics or to train strategists, campaign
planners, or tacticians.
If naval warfare is perceived different and should be handled
as a special case, then naval warfare ought to be handled in this
manner. To not do so risks having naval commanders reject models
without considering the substance. Modelers may have to approach
the truth of the issue when it comes to minimizing computer code
and the like. The modeler certainly must know whether or not
generic attrition models apply egually to land and sea warfare,
or to both Red and Blue. Perhaps the best answer to the question
posed by the title of this essay is that naval warfare can be
fought not only from ships at sea but also from space and in
certain types of "land" warfare.
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An argument that naval warfare is different is not an
argument that it is necessarily more important than other forms
of warfare. One of the major benefits of reading Alfred Thayer
Mahan is to learn that the French Navy was defeated, in part, due
to France's attempt to operate the fleet as an adjunct of the
Army, and by officers who either did not understand the sea or
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had their primary experience in the merchant service. Without
free use of the seas, the French nation could not achieve the
political, economic, and military objectives on land that it set
for itself. Considering the importance of naval warfare to France
leads the analyst to conclude that the impact of naval warfare
often takes an extended period to take effect, but when it does,
20
its effect is strategic.
Naval warfare may not actually be "unique" and there may be
no objective reason why land-oriented generals cannot command
fleets; indeed one can point to the successful amphibious
campaigns that were directed during World War II by Generals
Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur. If, however those
generals do not feel that they have the capability for maritime
command, if the sailors of the fleet lack confidence in their
commanders regarding the special knowledge to inspire their best
performance, then perhaps we had best leave command of the fleet
to seamen.
Over the years, naval power has allowed what would have
otherwise been minor political actors to make major global
political gains. It does not take a great investment for any
coastal state to initially become a local naval power. If there
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is a significant choke point in the region, a minor political
power can exert substantial local maritime and political
influence. Only the most developed nations can perform
sophisticated maritime missions such as deep submergence,
exploitation of the deep seas, and distant power projection.
Navies, like other military services , normally operate
outside the public consciousness. The subtle, slow, and indirect
influence of naval warfare helps to shelter maritime affairs from
most public consciousness. In a democracy, the public will
ultimately decide how much it is willing to invest in government
and defense. Navies are often out of sight and out of mind, so
that the public rarely understands the extent and value of sea
power and even more rarely is willing to provide the support it
deserves. Happily, this nation has a consciousness that tends to
support a substantial navy (but only to maintain a relatively
modest army) . The United States thinks and acts like a maritime
nation. The Soviet Union does not. Gaming and politico-mi J itary
simulations must capture that difference.
Sea power is not an end in itself. Its value lies in the
ability to protect commerce, project power ashore or to take
actions for political gain. The ob _'e:-tives of war apply to
warfare at sea. We cannot afford to have one set of concepts and
theories for warfare and armed conflict and a separate set for
employment at sea. The different cultural differences between
warfare at sea and warfare ashore, however, do matter in the same
way that strategic culture between nations matters. Naval
warfare may not be "unigue" any more than land warfare is
25
different than aerial combat but the differences are significant
enough to reguire special consideration.
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1. Sea Power: A Naval History, E.B. Potter, Ed., Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960, pp. 788-789. The
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Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1978, pp. 1-8 argues that
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not yet been settled by international law.
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by the two superpowers. The Soviet Union and Soviet Navy follows
the German lead in breaking war down into three levels;
strategic, operational, and tactical. The U.S. Navy does not use
this concept of a separate operational level of warfare nor the
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operational art," see Dr. R.H.S. Stolfi, Soviet Naval Operational
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Proceedings , Vol. 113, No. 2, February 1987, pp. 64-70.
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